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Should There Be a Specialized Ethics Code for
Death-Penalty Defense Lawyers?
BRUCE A. GREEN*
ABSTRACT
State ethics codes based on the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
address lawyers' work in advocacy but do not target lawyers' work in particular
areas of advocacy or in other specialized practice areas. For more than forty
years, critics have asserted that existing ethics rules are too superficial and
should be supplemented by specialized rules. This article examines the utility of
specialized ethics rules for one particular sub-specialty-death-penalty defense
practice. After identifying arguments for and against a specialized ethics code for
death-penalty cases, the article analyzes the arguments in the context of a
particular ethics dilemma that some death-penalty defense lawyers have
encountered-namely, whether to pursue post-conviction relief on behalf of an
ambivalent or unexpressive mentally-ill death-row inmate. The article finds
persuasive reasons for courts to develop specialized rules that would provide
death-penalty defense lawyers more clarity in how to address this and other
ethics dilemmas. Recognizing that courts will likely remain indifferent to the idea
of developing specialized ethics rules, however, the article concludes by
identifying other ways for courts to mitigate the uncertainties that specialized
rules would address.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article asks whether there should be a specialized ethics code for death
penalty defense lawyers. The question is an occasion for exploring the nature of
the legal profession's ethics rules and regulations. At present, state courts' rules
of professional conduct are not tailored to specific practice settings but apply to
lawyers across a broad range of practice areas. Do the rules provide too little
guidance to lawyers regarding the problems they confront in their daily
practices? Should courts give lawyers more, and better targeted, guidance by
adopting specialized ethics codes or by incorporating specialized ethics rules
within a single, lengthier, more comprehensive ethics code? Or do even the
current generally applicable rules of professional conduct themselves impose too
much constraint on lawyers' exercise of professional or personal judgment and
independence? This Article explores these questions in the context of one
particular sub-specialty--death-penalty defense practice.
In almost every state, the judiciary has adopted an ethics code, based on the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, to govern lawyers' work.1 Because there is
one ethics code for all lawyers in the state, the individual rules tend to be general.
To be sure, some rules are particularly pertinent to broad classes of practitioners-
for example, some of the rules' guidance is directed at litigators as opposed to
2transactional lawyers, or private practitioners as opposed to government and
public interest lawyers. 3 But with the limited exception of a narrow rule
specifically directed at criminal prosecutors,4 and another directed at government
1. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2009) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].
2. See, e.g., MODEL RULES R. 3.1 3.9; Bruce A. Green, Judicial Regulation of US Civil Litigators, 16 LEGAL
ETHICS 306, 306 (2013) ("Many rules apply specifically to lawyers serving as advocates.").
3. See, e.g., MODEL RULES R. 1.5 (regulating legal fees); MODEL RULES R. 7.3(a) (restricting solicitation of
clients for pecuniary gain).
4. See MODEL RULES R. 3.8 ("Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor"). The rule forbids prosecutors from
pursuing charges without probable cause; addresses dealings with unrepresented defendants; imposes a pretrial
disclosure obligation that is largely (and in some courts' view, entirely) congruent with the constitutional
disclosure duty; restricts the issuance of subpoenas to criminal defendants' lawyers; restricts extrajudicial
[Vol. 29:527
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lawyers' conflicts of interest,5 the ethics rules do not target particular practice
areas.6 Although several provisions make distinctions for criminal defense,7 none
are specifically targeted at criminal defense representation much less at the
sub-specialty of death penalty defense-the most complex and consequential
kind of criminal defense representation.8
The generality of the state ethics codes poses a problem for lawyers when
ethics questions that arise in specialized areas of practice are not answered
adequately, clearly, or at all by any of the professional conduct rules.9 In such
instances, lawyers might use their best judgment or seek guidance elsewhere,
such as in judicial and bar opinions."1 Some bar associations try to fill the gaps by
publishing unenforceable standards or guidelines for lawyers in particular
practice settings.11 Various federal agencies have also adopted specialized
regulations for lawyers practicing before them. 
12
communications; and establishes post-conviction obligations upon the discovery of new exculpatory evidence.
Id. The rule has been criticized for addressing prosecutors' special obligations to only a limited extent. See
Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Ethics as Usual, 2003 U. ILL L. REV. 1573, 1587 (2003). Even at that, few if any
states have adopted all of the provisions of Model Rule 3.8.
5. See MODEL RULES R. 1.11.
6. If judging were to be viewed as a specialized role of lawyers, then an exception would be the ABA Model
Code of Judicial Conduct and counterpart state ethics codes for judges.
7. See MODEL RULES R. 1.2(a) (requiring that, in representing a criminal defendant, a lawyer must abide by
the defendant's decisions whether to plead guilty, waive a jury trial, or testify); MODEL RULES R. 1.5(d)(2) (a
lawyer generally may charge a contingent fee, but not in a criminal case); MODEL RULES R. 3.1 (although a
lawyer generally may not assert a frivolous position, a criminal defendant's lawyer may "defend the proceeding
as to require that every element of the case be established"); MODEL RULES R. 3.3(a)(3) (in general, an advocate
may refuse to offer testimony "that the lawyer reasonably believes is false," but a criminal defense lawyer may
not refuse to offer a criminal defendant's testimony based on this belief).
8. See, e.g., Eric M. Freedman, Giarratano is a Scarecrow: The Right to Counsel in State Capital
Postconviction Proceedings, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1079, 1096 (2006) ("The undeniable reality that litigating
death penalty cases is infinitely more complicated than other criminal cases has only grown more stark as a
result of [recent] legal developments .. "); Andrea D. Lyon, Mixed Media: Popular Culture and Race and
Their Effect on Jury Selection, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 681, 681 (2009) ("Jury selection in a capital case is far more
complicated and difficult than in an ordinary case."); Bradley A. MacLean, Effective Capital Defense
Representation and the Difficult Client, 76 TENN. L. REV. 661, 661 (2009) ("[D]eveloping rapport with a client
accused of capital murder can be one of the most challenging aspects of defending a capital case.").
9. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, Zealous Representation Bound: The Intersection of the Ethical Codes and the
Criminal Law, 69 N.C. L. REV. 687, 687 (1991) (arguing that ethics rules should give greater clarity in areas of
conduct in which advocates are put at risk of violating criminal law); Ted Schneyer, From Self-Regulation to
Bar Corporatism: What the S&L Crisis Means for the Regulation of Lawyers, 35 S. TEX. L. REV. 639, 650-64
(1994) (observing that ethics rules are too general and vague to guide banking lawyers).
10. See generally Bruce A. Green, Bar Association Ethics Committees: Are They Broken?, 30 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 731 (2002) (discussing utility of bar associations' ethics opinions).
11. See, e.g., AM. COLL. OF TR. & ESTATE COUNSEL, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT; ROBERT H. ARONSON ET AL., BOUNDS OF ADVOCACY: STANDARDS OF CONDUCT (American Academy of
Matrimonial Lawyers ed., 1991), http://www.actec.org/publications/commentaries/ [https://perma.cc/GA4K-
EWYH] (last visited May 19, 2016).
12. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 10.20 (2015) (governing federal tax practitioners); see generally Bruce A. Green,
Whose Rules of Professional Conduct Should Govern Lawyers in Federal Court and How Should the Rules Be
Created?, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 460, 465 n.22 (1996) [hereinafter Green, Whose Rules] (citing examples);
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The professional conduct rules' failure to give adequate clarity and direction
has long been a concern. Forty years ago, Monroe Freedman observed that the
predecessor to the Model Rules, the ABA's Model Code of Professional
Responsibility, on which most state ethics codes were then based, was "marred by
considerable superficiality." 13 In 1978, in response to this concern, a distin-
guished group of judges, practitioners and academics nearly unanimously
recommended that the ethics code "be redrafted to incorporate standards of
conduct applicable to specialty fields within the practice of law." 14 Since then,
others have similarly proposed adding specialized ethics rules for lawyers in
particular fields of practice, 15 such as criminal defense, 16 or have urged courts to
adopt entirely separate ethics codes for practitioners in some specialized areas of
practice. 17 However, the bench and bar have not responded to the call. To date,
the American Bar Association ("ABA") has never proposed, and no jurisdiction
Fred C. Zacharias, Reconceptualizing Ethical Roles, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 169, 190 n.97 (1997) [hereinafter
Zacharias, Reconceptualizing] (citing examples). Regulations are not necessarily intended to explicate ethics
rules or fill in the gaps. Consequently, they may not compensate for the uncertainty or incompleteness of ethics
codes, but may make matters worse, either because they do not resolve lawyers' ethical questions appropriately
or because they conflict with ethics rules.
13. MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 128 (1975).
14. ROSCOE POUND AMERICAN TRIAL LAWYERS FOUNDATION, ANNUAL CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN
CONFERENCE ON ADVOCACY IN THE UNITED STATES, ETHICS AND ADVOCACY: FINAL REPORT 10 (1978) [hereinafter
ETHICS AND ADVOCACY].
15. See, e.g., Christopher M. Fairman, Why We Still Need a Model Rule for Collaborative Law: A Reply to
Professor Lande, 22 OHIO ST. L. J. ON DISp. RESOL. 707 (2007) (advocating special rules for collaborative
lawyering); David R. Katner, The Ethical Struggle of Usurping Juvenile Client Autonomy by Raising
Competency in Delinquency and Criminal Cases, 16 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L. J. 293, 323 (2007) (noting possibility
of a special rule for representing juveniles); Peter Margulies, True Believers at Law: National Security Agendas,
the Regulation of Lawyers, and the Separation of Powers, 68 MD. L. REV. 1, 8 (2008) (advocating specialized
ethics rules for national security lawyers); see also Peter A. Joy & Robert R. Kuehn, Conflict of Interest and
Competency Issues in Law Clinic Practice, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 493, 498 99 (2002) (noting absence of
specialized ethics rules for public interest practice); Jan E. Rein, Clients with Destructive and Socially Harmful
Choices What's an Attorney to Do?: Within and Beyond the Competency Construct, 62 FORDHAM L. REV.
1101, 1153 (1994) (suggesting utility of an ethics rule for multidisciplinary practice by elder law attorneys); cf
Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 469, 471 (1994) (maintaining
that attention should be given to the particular ethics issues of lawyers in mass tort cases).
16. See, e.g., Kim Taylor-Thompson, Individual Actor v. Institutional Player: Alternating Visions of the
Public Defender, 84 GEO. L. J. 2419, 2464 65 (1996) (advocating amendment of rules to address conflicts of
interest in public defender offices). For discussions of whether criminal defense lawyers' ethical stance differs
from that of other advocates, see generally David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV.
1729 (1993); William H. Simon, The Ethics of Criminal Defense, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1703, 1767 (1993).
17. See, e.g., Richard E. Crouch, The Matter of Bombers: Unfair Tactics and the Problem of Defining
Unethical Behavior in Divorce Litigation, 20 FAN. L. Q. 413,435 38 (1986) (advocating "special ethics code to
govern matrimonial practice"); Nancy B. Rapoport, Our House, Our Rules: The Need for a Uniform Code of
Bankruptcy Ethics, 6 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 45 (1998); Stanley Sporkin, The Need for Separate Codes of
Professional Conduct for the Various Specialties, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 149, 149 (1993) (advocating
specialized ethics codes in fields such as corporate and securities practice); see also Zacharias, Reconceptualiz-
ing, supra note 12, at 190 ("[C]ommentators have proposed the adoption of specialized codes of conduct
covering lawyers engaged in particular areas of practice.") (citing examples).
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has adopted, an enforceable ethics code that is specifically directed at criminal
defense or any other specialized area of lawyers' work.
This essay explores the question of whether there should be specialized ethics
rules or codes by focusing on the work of lawyers in one specialized area of
practice-namely, death penalty defense. At present, criminal defense lawyers,
including those defending death penalty cases, are regulated by the ethics rules
applicable generally to lawyers. Recognizing the need for further guidance,
including with regard to questions of professional conduct, the ABA has
published various sets of guidelines for criminal defense lawyers and others in
the criminal justice process, 8 including guidelines on capital defense.1 9 The
State Bar of Texas has adopted the ABA's capital defense guidelines as tailored to
the state's criminal practice. 20 But the current guidelines for capital defense do
not deal with ethics questions per se, 21 but focus on how to provide high-quality
representation in capital cases.22 Moreover, some may generally consider it
inadequate to supplement professional conduct rules by adopting guidelines
which, although they may influence courts' development of other law, are not
themselves enforceable through the disciplinary process and do not otherwise
have the force of law. 23 Through an examination of a professional conduct
18. The best known are the standards concerning the prosecution and defense functions. See Criminal Justice
Standards for the Prosecution Function: Table of Contents, AM. BAR Ass'N, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/
criminal-justice/standards/ProsecutionFunctionFourthEdition-TableofContents.html [https://perma.cc/6LBF-L
JVL] (last visited Mar. 14, 2016); Criminal Justice Standards for the Defense Function: Table of Contents, AM.
BAR Ass'N, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal-justice/standards/DefenseFunctionFourthEdition-T
ableofContents.html [https://perma.cc/VW9T-DZLH] (last visited Mar. 14, 2016); see generally Bruce A.
Green, Developing Standards of Conduct for Prosecutors and Criminal Defense Lawyers, 62 HASTINGS L. J.
1093 (2011) [hereinafter Green, Developing Standards]; Rory K. Little, The ABA's Project To Revise the
Criminal Justice Standards for the Prosecution and Defense Functions, 62 HASTINGS L. J. 1111 (2011). In 1980,
the Massachusetts Supreme Court adopted a rule governing prosecutors and defense lawyers based on
provisions of the ABA prosecution and defense function standards. See Rules of the Supreme Judicial Court,
382 Mass. 698, *135 50 (1980). However, the Court later repealed the rule, effective January 1, 1999. See
MAss. TRIAL COURT LAW LIBRARIES, MASSACHUSETTS RULES OF THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 3:08 (2015),
http://www.mass.gov/courts/docs/lawlib/docs/sjc-rules.pdf [https://perma.cc/B5XR-7GND] (last visited May
19, 2016). For other standards addressing such subjects as criminal defense lawyers' representation of mentally
ill clients, see Criminal Justice Standards, AM. BAR Ass'N, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal-justice/
standards.html [https://perma.cc/U5YV-PZDY] (last visited Mar. 14, 2016).
19. See generally The Tenth Anniversary of the ABA Capital Defense Guidelines: The Road Traveled and the
Road to be Traveled, 42 HOFSTRA L. REv. 913 (2013) [hereinafter ABA Capital Defense Guidelines].
20. Guidelines and Standards for Texas Capital Counsel, ST. B. OF TEX. (Apr. 21, 2006), http://www.
americanbar.org/contenddam/aba/uncategorized/Death-Penalty-Representation/Standards/State/TX Bar A
ssociation adopted-version of ABAGuidelines.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/7ZEH-4NX6]; see
Catherine G. Burnett, Guidelines and Standards for Texas Capital Counsel: The Dilemma of Enforcement, 34
AM. J. CRIM. L. 165 (2007).
21. See Victor L. Streib, Would You Lie to Save Your Client's Life? Ethics and Effectiveness in Defending
Against Death, 42 BRANDEIS L. J. 405, 432 (2004) (observing "the ABA Guidelines' treatment of ethical issues
cannot be characterized as more than a passing nod").
22. See ABA Capital Defense Guidelines, supra note 19, at 919.
23. See, e.g., Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524 25 (2003) (citing GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND
PERFORMANCE OF COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES 11.4.1(C) (AM. BAR ASS'N 1989)); Strickland v.
2016]
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question that death penalty defense lawyers might confront, this essay considers
whether the public would be better served by the adoption of specialized,
enforceable ethics rules to govern lawyers' resolution of ethical dilemmas that
appear to present unique problems or merit unique resolutions in particular
practice settings.
I. GENERAL ARGUMENTS REGARDING A SPECIALIZED ETHICS CODE FOR
DEATH PENALTY DEFENSE LAWYERS
In the abstract, the argument in favor of a separate set of ethics rules for death
penalty defense lawyers seems straightforward. Capital defense is significantly
different from the contexts in which lawyers, including litigators, generally
practice. 24 "Context is important to determining what professional conduct is
proper; '25  and "specific rules are superior to general rules in capturing
appropriate contextual distinctions. 2 6 Specialized rules for capital defenders
could resolve some problems that the generalized rules either do not answer
clearly or overlook altogether. Specialized rules could also address some
questions that the generalized rules do answer clearly but do not answer
optimally insofar as one believes that the generally preferred approach does not
always work well in the capital defense context. The Model Rules and their state
counterparts currently make some distinctions for criminal defense representa-
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 89 (1994) (holding that ABA Standards may be guides to determining whether
criminal defense lawyer's performance fell below the standard of reasonableness for purposes of the Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel); see Russell Stetler & W. Bradley Wendel, The ABA
Guidelines and the Norms of Capital Defense Representation, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 635 (2013) (discussing and
critiquing the Supreme Court's debate regarding the utility of the ABA Guidelines); see also infra notes 45-48
and accompanying text.
24. See, e.g., Streib, supra note 21; see also Christy Chandler, Voluntary Executions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1897,
1897 (1998) ("The professional model rules and ethics codes fail to provide capital defense attorneys with
adequate guidance when faced with a client who wants to die."); Michael Mello, The Non-Trial of the Century:
Representations of the Unabomber, 24 VT. L. REv. 417, 528 (2000) ("For the capital defense lawyer, issues of
ethics are neither theoretical nor abstract. How he or she addresses these issues will drive virtually every aspect
of how the client's case will be investigated and litigated.").
25. Green, Whose Rules, supra note 12, at 517. More than two decades ago, David Wilkins underscored the
importance of context in resolving professional responsibility questions. See David B. Wilkins, Making Context
Count: Regulating Lawyers After Kaye, Scholer, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 1145 (1993) [hereinafter Wilkins, Making
Context Count]; David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. REv. 468, 515 19 (1990); see also
David B. Wilkins, Some Realism about Legal Realism for Lawyers, in LAWYERS IN PRACTICE: ETHICAL DECISION
MAKING IN CONTEXT 25, 40 (Leslie C. Levin & Lynn Mather eds., 2012). There is now a robust body of literature
reflecting an academic consensus around Wilkins's insight that "context counts." See, e.g., LESLIE C. LEVIN &
LYNN MATHER, Epilogue, in LAWYERS IN PRACTICE: ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN CONTEXT 365 70, 370 (2012);
James G. Pope, Two Faces, Two Ethics: Labor Union Lawyers and the Emerging Doctrine of Entity Ethics, 68
OR. L. REV. 1, 54 (1989); Rebecca Roiphe, The Ethics of Willful Ignorance, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 187, 191
(2011); Ann Southworth, Collective Representation for the Disadvantaged: Variations in Problems of
Accountability, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 2449, 2449 50 (1999); Eli Wald, Resizing the Rules of Professional
Conduct, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 227, 282 83 (2014).
26. Green, Whose Rules, supra note 12, at 517.
[Vol. 29:527
ETHICS CODE FOR DEATH-PENALTY DEFENSE LAWYERS
tion,7 and it is possible that further distinctions are warranted in the highly
specialized setting in which death penalty defense lawyers work.
If there are areas of practice where generalized ethics rules provide insufficient
guidance, one might assume that death penalty defense is one of them. The
differences between criminal defense and corporate practices, or between
criminal and civil advocacy, are further sharpened when it comes to death penalty
defense, which is significantly different even from ordinary criminal defense
representation. For example, the process differs: in the death penalty process, an
unsuccessful defense with regard to criminal culpability is immediately followed
by a proceeding before the jury regarding the sentence, and a defense lawyer
must prepare for, and be sensitive to the interrelationship between, the trial and
penalty phases.28 The investigative and advocacy work that lawyers are expected
to undertake to persuade a jury that mitigating factors predominate differs from
criminal defense lawyers' ordinary work in seeking leniency for clients. 29 The
unusual nature and vulnerability of the clientele-individuals, many with mental
impairments, whose lives are on the line-leads to particular challenges of
decision-making and counseling. 30 That the client's life is at stake means that
tensions between values underlying the ethics rules-for example, between the
client's best interests and the client's autonomy--can be posed particularly
sharply.31 Death penalty defense is complex and demanding, 32 and the quality of
27. See MODEL RULES R. 1.2(a); MODEL RULES R. 1.5(d)(2); MODEL RULES R. 3.1; MODEL RULES R.
3.3(a)(3).
28. See, e.g., Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 192 (2004) (concluding "in a capital case, counsel must
consider in conjunction both the guilt and penalty phases in determining how best to proceed"); see generally
Scott E. Sundby, The Capital Jury and Absolution: The Intersection of Trial Strategy, Remorse, and the Death
Penalty, 83 CORNELLL. REv. 1557 (1998).
29. See generally Jonathan P. Tomes, Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don't: The Use of Mitigation
Experts in Death Penalty Litigation, 24 AM. J. CRIM. L. 359 (1997); cf Todd Haugh, Can the CEO Learn from
the Condemned? The Application of Capital Mitigation Strategies to White Collar Cases, 62 AM. U. L. REv. 1
(2012); see also infra note 106.
30. See, e.g., Rebecca J. Covarrubias, Comment, Lives in Defense Counsel's Hands: The Problems and
Responsibilities of Defense Counsel Representing Mentally Ill or Mentally Retarded Capital Defendants, 11
SCHOLAR: ST. MARY'S L. REV. ON MINORITY ISSUES 413, 436 53 (2009).
31. See, e.g., J.C. Oleson, Swilling Hemlock: The Legal Ethics of Defending a Client Who Wishes to
Volunteer for Execution, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 147, 154 (2006) ("The most difficult ethical dilemma that
faces capital attorneys may be what to do about the 'volunteer,' the client who wishes to waive his appeals and to
expedite his own execution. The situation... disrupts the normal processes of the law and leaves the defense
attorney in an awkward no-man's land, wrestling against a knot of thorns, unsure of what legal duty ultimately
requires."); see also Brian D. Shannon & Victor R. Scarano, Incompetency to Be Executed: Continuing Ethical
Challenges & TimeforA Change in Texas, 45 TEX. TECH L. REv. 419,427 28 (2013) (discussing ethical tension
where death penalty defense lawyer must take a position regarding whether a mentally ill client should receive
medical treatment that would restore him to competency to stand trial); cf Josephine Ross, Autonomy Versus a
Client's Best Interests: The Defense Lawyer's Dilemma when Mentally Ill Clients Seek to Control Their Defense,
35 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1343 (1988).
32. See, e.g., James M. Doyle, The Lawyers'Art: "Representation" in Capital Cases, 8 YALE J. L. & HUMAN.
417 (1996); Jordan M. Steiker, Improving Representation in Capital Cases: Establishing the Right Baselines in
2016]
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the defense matters to the outcome.3 3
Further, death penalty defense would seem to be an area of practice where it is
especially important for lawyers to resolve ethics problems appropriately, and
where lawyers would need more guidance than usual in determining how to reach
adequate resolutions. First, the life-or-death stakes in this area of practice
enhance the need for lawyers to make wise choices, including with regard to
professional conduct questions.34 In commercial lawsuits and transactions, where
typically only money is on the line, the consequences of wrong choices pale in
comparison. Second, death penalty defense is an area of practice where there is
particular skepticism about the quality of representation. Historically, there has
been a vast mismatch between the necessary level of skill and the trial lawyers'
qualifications, 35 and post-conviction challenges to death sentences typically
include attacks on the trial lawyers' competence.36 Needless to say, unlike most
corporate clients, most criminal defendants-and probably all capital defendants-
lack the sophistication and wherewithal to oversee their lawyers to ensure that
they comply with professional expectations.37
But if one were to suggest that death penalty defense lawyers should have their
own set of ethics rules, objections of various kinds would predictably fly in from
every corner-from the organized bar, the judiciary, practitioners, and academics
alike.
The organized bar disfavors specialized ethics codes, whether for death
penalty defense or any other area of practice. One reason is that the bar wants
lawyers to be part of a unified profession and perceives that specialized codes
Federal Habeas to Promote Structural Reform Within States, 34 AM. J. CRIM. L. 293, 314 (2007) (noting the
ABA's recognition of "the extraordinary demands of capital representation").
33. Cf James M. Anderson & Paul Heaton, How Much Difference Does the Lawyer Make? The Effect of
Defense Counsel on Murder Case Outcomes, 122 YALE L. J. 154 (2012).
34. Cf The Eighth Amendment and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Capital Trials, 107 HARV. L. REv.
1923, 1924 (1994) (arguing for a higher constitutional standard for effective assistance of counsel in capital
cases, in part, because "[t]he quality of counsel is often literally a matter of life and death for the capital
defendant").
35. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, Lethal Fiction: The Meaning of "Counsel" in the Sixth Amendment, 78 lowA L.
REv. 433, 491 (1993) ("In states where assigned lawyers do not necessarily specialize in the defense of criminal
cases, the assignment of unqualified lawyers appears, by virtually all accounts, to be a common occurrence.");
Ira Mickenberg, Drunk, Sleeping, and Incompetent Lawyers: Is it Possible to Keep Innocent People Off Death
Row?, 29 U. DAYTON L. REV. 319, 321 (2004) (referring to "the hundreds of reported cases where defendants
facing the death penalty were given representation that would be utterly unacceptable in any other legal
context"); Jordan M. Steiker, supra note 32, at 293 n.1 ("Virtually everyone involved in capital litigation
recognizes and laments the poor representation afforded capital defendants at trial.").
36. NANCY J. KING, FRED L. CHEESMAN II & BRIAN J. OSTROM, FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT: HABEAS LITIGATION
IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS 28 (2007), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/219559.pdf [https://perma.cc/
S4JZ-EH78] (last visited May 19, 2016) ("81% of capital cases studied included at least one claim alleging
ineffective assistance").
37. See generally David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REv. 801, 824 30 (1992)
(explaining why corporate clients need not resort to the disciplinary process when they are victims of their
lawyers' disciplinary misconduct).
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would undermine professional unity 38-an objective of which some commenta-
tors are skeptical. 39 Those involved in the drafting process also state a
philosophical preference for ethics rules that express general principles over a
series of provisions addressing particular settings in which relatively few lawyers
practice. 40 They do not want the ethics code to resemble the tax code in length or
complexity.
At least in the context of death penalty defense, the bar's traditional concerns
do not seem particularly compelling, however. There is little need to worry about
the possibility that death penalty lawyers, who are few in number and highly
dependent on the organized bar for support, would seek to set themselves up as a
separate profession. The adoption of specialized rules for these few lawyers
would not significantly challenge the concept of a unified bar but would signify
simply that death penalty defense representation differs in some respects from
other practice areas. In any case, the symbolic and aesthetic concerns seem
unimportant as compared with the public interest in helping death penalty
defense lawyers make better decisions on questions of professional conduct when
lives are on the line.
Judiciaries are unlikely to welcome the burden of adopting specialized ethics
codes because drafting them could demand considerable time and effort on
judges' part.4 1 While courts could simply rubber-stamp rules drafted by bar
38. See Bruce Green, Foreword: Rationing Lawyers: Ethical and Professional Issues in the Delivery of
Legal Services to Low-Income Clients, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 1713, 1718 n.24 (1999) (noting the organized bar's
"commitment to the principle that the legal profession is a unified profession with a universally applicable set of
professional norms"); Dana A. Remus, Out ofPractice: The Twenty-First Century Legal Profession, 63 DuKE L.
J. 1243, 1245 (2014) (maintaining that the current regulatory system is founded on the premise that the legal
profession is unified, and that this premise justifies "a single, broadly applicable code of conduct"); Wilkins,
Making Context Count, supra note 25, at 1218 19 ("By suppressing undeniably relevant differences among
types of lawyers, the argument runs, uniform rules of professional responsibility foster a feeling of communal
solidarity across the entire profession."); see also Fred C. Zacharias, Federalizing Legal Ethics, 73 TEX. L. REv.
335, 385 86 (1994) (noting the ethics codes' "basic approach of considering lawyers' duties to be uniform,
whatever role the lawyer plays").
39. Commentators have questioned both the legitimacy and the utility of the concept of a "unified
profession." See, e.g., Keith R. Fisher, The Higher Calling: Regulation of Lawyers Post-Enron, 37 U. MICH.
J. L. REFORM 1017, 1144 (2004) ("Manipulation, motivated by politics and self-interest, of the ideology of the
bar to adhere to rules of ethics predicated on an antiquated and no longer realistic model of a unified profession
has likewise been counterproductive."); Rebecca Roiphe, A History of Professionalism: Julius Henry Cohen
and the Professions as a Route to Citizenship, 40 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 33, 74 (2012) (arguing that the "unified
profession" is a "myth" and that regulators risk carrying the concept beyond its useful limits).
40. See Green, Whose Rules, supra note 12, at 490 n. 146 (quoting then-Chair of ABA ethics committee: "the
proper role of the Model Rules is best served by preserving their character as relatively general statements of
principle rather than detailed prescriptions for implementation of those principles").
41. For example, the ABA's adoption of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct building on the
existing ethics code was "the product of six years of exhaustive study, drafting and debate." A New Ethics
Code: ABA Adopts Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 70 A.B.A.J. 79 (Jan. 1984). And that was only the
beginning. State judiciaries then studied the ABA model, typically with engagement of the state bar, to decide
which model rules to adopt, which to revise, and which to reject entirely, perhaps in favor of an existing
provision or one newly drafted. To do the same for multiple sets of specialized rules might seem to be an even
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associations, they might be reluctant to do so, lest they wind up with rules that are
not well-balanced but that reflect the preferences of an unrepresentative segment
of the bar.42 Additionally, specialized codes would narrow courts' latitude to
establish professional norms in the course of litigation either by announcing
standards of conduct pursuant to their supervisory authority or by interpreting
rules loosely to achieve favorable outcomes.43 Many judges prefer to establish
professional norms on an ad hoc basis in adjudication in this common-law
manner, based on a concrete factual situation and with the benefit of argument by
opposing counsel, because they see this as a better process for discerning and
expressing the optimal norms, or because they do not believe that rules can
capture relevant factual nuances and subtleties. In the death penalty context in
particular, judges may prefer ethics rules that are general, rather than specific, in
order to preserve death penalty defense lawyers' ability to exercise independent
judgment and to preserve courts' ultimate authority to judge lawyers' conduct in
light of the particular circumstances.
Some of these themes were sounded in the Supreme Court opinions in Bobby v.
Van Hook,44 which addressed the relevance of ABA standards in deciding
ineffective assistance of counsel claims. In Van Hook, the Court unanimously
overturned an appellate court's finding that the capital defendant's lawyer
provided constitutionally substandard representation at trial. In concluding that
the lawyer's investigation and presentation of evidence were inadequate, the
appeals court had relied on the ABA's 2003 guidelines for death penalty defense
lawyers, even though Van Hook's trial was in the 1980's. 45 In the course of taking
the lower court to task for judging the reasonableness of the defense according to
later-adopted standards, the Court questioned the utility of professional standards
in general. It noted, as it had in a previous opinion, that a court is not bound by
"specific rules adopted by states to ensure that criminal defendants are well
represented," but that, for constitutional purposes, what matters is whether the
lawyer's conduct was objectively reasonable.46 Further, professional standards
more daunting undertaking. Even the processes for amending the ABA Model Rules by making comparatively
few changes or additions have involved considerable process.
42. See Bruce A. Green, Doe v. Federal Grievance Committee: On the Interpretation of Ethical Rules, 55
BROOK. L. REV. 485 (1989) (arguing that courts have authority to adopt ethics rules liberally, in common-law
fashion); Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Rationalizing Judicial Regulation of Lawyers, 70 OHIO ST. L. J.
73, 92 97 (2009) [hereinafter Zacharias & Green, Rationalizing Judicial Regulation] (criticizing courts'
inclination to disregard ethics rules that the judiciary adopted without adequate consideration, based on bar
proposals).
43. See Zacharias & Green, Rationalizing Judicial Regulation, supra note 42 (arguing that courts should not
be entirely free to disregard ethics rules when ruling in adjudication).
44. Bobby v. Van Hook, 558 U.S. 4 (2009).
45. Id. at 6 (citing Van Hook v. Anderson, 560 F.3d 523, 525 (6th Cir. 2009)).
46. Id. at 9 (quoting Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 479 (2000)). One might take issue with the premise
that a lawyer's professional conduct can be "reasonable," for constitutional purposes or otherwise, if the
conduct clearly violates a rule of professional conduct. See United States v. Williams, 698 E3d 374, 390 (7th
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might not even be relevant evidence of what reasonable legal representation
entails if they are "so detailed that they would 'interfere with the constitutionally
protected independence of counsel and restrict the wide latitude counsel must
have in making tactical decisions. -47
At least when it comes to the Model Rules and their state counterparts, as
opposed to other standards or guidelines, one might question the significance of
these judicial concerns. As noted, standards and guidelines are adopted by bar
associations, not by courts or other law-making authorities. They may provide the
interpretive views of a non-authoritative body, offer professional guidance
regarding optimal practice where the ethics rules are vague or silent, encourage
lawyers to aspire to a "higher" standard of professionalism than ethics rules
demand, or delineate high-quality representation rather than ethics per se. Unlike
bar association standards or guidelines, ethics rules are law. They are legally
enforceable in the disciplinary process and are entitled to as much respect as the
common law or any other law adopted by courts.48 Moreover, it is by no means
clear that when courts have the opportunity to develop standards by either means,
courts adopt better standards of conduct through the common law process rather
than through the rule-making process.49
In the death penalty context in particular, a preference for common-law
decision-making seems questionable because courts may wait a long time before
they conclusively resolve questions that could be the subject of a rule. Death
penalty cases are infrequent. Even more rare are occasions in death penalty cases
when ethics questions are called to courts' attention and require judicial
resolution. 0 Consequently, many or most thorny ethics questions encountered by
Cir. 2012) (Hamilton, J. dissenting) ("Where the standards of professional conduct, including explanatory
comments, reflect such a clear and broad consensus as they do here, they provide a reliable guide to the Sixth
Amendment and the advocacy that an accused has every right to expect from his lawyer."). The professional
conduct rules are not mere guidelines or recommendations but are adopted by courts, in their law-making
capacity, to establish the governing legal standard for professional discipline, including disbarment and
suspension in other words, unlike bar association standards, the rules are enforceable law for lawyers. Given
that violations of the law are ordinarily negligence per se, see, e.g., Grable & Sons Metal Prods. v. Dame Eng'g
& Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 318 (2005), it is hard to see how a court, or a lawyer, can ordinarily conclude that a rule
violation is "reasonable" professional conduct.
47. Van Hook, 558 U.S. at 8 n.1 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984)).
48. See Zacharias & Green, Rationalizing Judicial Regulation, note 42, at 92 97 (concluding that "although
the motivation for treating the professional rules as weak law is understandable, that approach is neither
legitimate as a theoretical matter nor likely to be an efficient method of regulating lawyers' professional conduct
as a practical matter").
49. See generally Green, Whose Rules, supra note 12.
50. The relatively few published judicial decisions regarding defense lawyers' professional conduct in death
penalty cases tend to involve unquestionably wrongful conduct. See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Niles, 644 So.2d 504 (Fla.
1994); In re Atkins, 320 S.E.2d 146 (Ga. 1984); In re Hawver, 339 P.3d 573 (Kan. 2014); State ex rel. Okla. Bar
Ass'n v. Wintory, 350 P.3d 131 (Okla. 2015). Particularly when the lawyer's conduct is within an area of
uncertainty, rather than comprising obviously egregious misconduct, disciplinary authorities would not
ordinarily be expected to initiate disciplinary proceedings. To the extent they come before the court, questions
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death penalty lawyers in actual practice may go unaddressed by courts for long
periods of time, leaving the lawyers uncertain how to resolve them in the interim.
Concurring in Bobby v. Van Hook, Justice Samuel Alito questioned the
relevance of professional standards entirely, based in part on a different concern:
the concern he voiced was essentially about regulatory capture51 '-namely, that
rather than advancing the public's best interest, courts deferring to the ABA
Standards would be advancing the perceived interests or preferences of the
organized bar, of the subset of lawyers who are members of the ABA, or of the
much smaller subset responsible for drafting the Standards. 2 Underlying this
concern is a recognition of the organized bar's eagerness to influence how the bar
is regulated,5 3 coupled with attendant skepticism about the purity of the bar's
motives. Justice Alito would not be alone in questioning whether professional
norms advocated by the ABA invariably best serve the public interest rather than
that of lawyers.5 4
At least in this context, however, it is hard to see why declining to regulate
through rule making is the appropriate response to the risk of regulatory capture.
Unlike the ABA Standards, which are drafted and adopted by the ABA,
professional conduct rules are ultimately the judiciary's responsibility.55 Courts
of criminal defense lawyers' ethics are typically raised in the context of ineffective assistance of counsel claims
or other claims in post-conviction challenges to the conviction or death sentence.
51. Cf Sidney A. Shapiro, The Complexity of Regulatory Capture: Diagnosis, Causality, and Remediation,
17 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 221, 223 24 (2012) (observing that regulatory capture has no fixed meaning, but
defining "capture as occurring when agencies consistently adopt regulatory policies favored by regulated
entities").
52. Justice Alito observed:
The ABA is a venerable organization with a history of service to the bar, but it is, after all, a private
group with limited membership. The views of the association's members, not to mention the views of
the members of the advisory committee that formulated the 2003 Guidelines, do not necessarily
reflect the views of the American bar as a whole. It is the responsibility of the courts to determine the
nature of the work that a defense attorney must do in a capital case in order to meet the obligations
imposed by the Constitution, and I see no reason why the ABA Guidelines should be given a
privileged position in making that determination.
Van Hook, 558 U.S. at 14 (Alito, J., concurring).
53. For a discussion of the bar's interest in "self-regulation," see Bruce A. Green, Lawyers' Professional
Independence: Overrated or Undervalued?, 46 AKRON L. REv. 599, 602-07 (2013).
54. See, e.g., Roberta K. Flowers, A Code of Their Own: Updating the Ethics Codes To Include the
Non-Adversarial Roles of Federal Prosecutors, 37 B.C. L. REv. 923, 966 (1996) (observing that "commentators
have questioned the non-partisan nature of the ABA and its expertise in fashioning ethics rules") (citing, inter
alia, JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, CRISIS AT THE BAR: LAWYERS' UNETHICAL ETHICS AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT 216-17
(1978) (noting that in drafting ethics rules the ABA has "the conflict of interest inherent in balancing
self-interest against public and client interest")); Deborah L. Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers: A Functional
Perspective on Professional Codes, 59 TEX. L. REv. 689, 692 (1981) (observing that ethics codes "consistently
resolved conflicts between professional and societal objectives in favor of those doing the resolving"). Even at
its most well-intentioned, the organized bar may have difficulty engaging in disinterested efforts to promote law
reform in the public interest. See Elizabeth Chambliss & Bruce A. Green, Some Realism About Bar
Associations, 57 DEPAUL L. REv. 425 (2008).
55. See Zacharias & Green, Rationalizing Judicial Regulation, supra note 42, at 94 95.
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need not defer to the ABA and may take responsibility for the drafting process if
they choose.5 6 Further, judicial skepticism about the legitimacy of the ABA
Standards, which courts are free to ignore, heightens the need for legally
enforceable rules to both guide lawyers and protect those who comply.
Consequently, the preferable response to concerns about regulatory capture by
the organized bar or its defense-oriented constituents would seem to be for courts
to take a stronger role in the drafting process. In doing so, courts can ensure that
others, such as prosecutors, with different perspectives from those of the
organized bar's representatives, have an opportunity to be heard.
Lawyers at opposite ends of the ideological spectrum might raise concerns of
their own about regulatory capture.57 Death penalty defense lawyers might fear
that prosecutors would dominate the rule-making process and that controversial
defense practices would be fair game for prosecutors to expose and de-
legitimize.5 8 Prosecutors, in turn, might think it more likely that criminal defense
lawyers would have the dominant role. They would worry that specialized rules
would be less restrictive for death penalty lawyers than for other lawyers, even
other criminal defense lawyers. For example, they might imagine that the rules
would authorize death penalty defense lawyers to file deleterious motions under
circumstances in which the current rules forbid other lawyers from doing so.
5 9
Lawyers' political worries, while going part way to explaining the absence of a
professional constituency in favor of an ethics code for death penalty lawyers,
seem somewhat trivial from the public perspective, however. Surely, courts are
able to avoid the risk that either defense lawyers or prosecutors would have an
inordinate influence over the rules. An adept and inclusive judicial rule-making
process that results in well-thought-out specialized rules would seem to be
preferable to maintaining a generalized set of ethics rules that is vague,
incomplete and potentially ill-suited to the particular problems of death penalty
defense.
Death penalty advocates might also feel stigmatized by the adoption of
specialized rules just for them, viewing the rules as implying that they are less
ethical than other lawyers and therefore in greater need of ethical restraint.
However, the inference would likely be belied by the content of the specialized
rules, which could well be less restrictive than the generally applicable rules or
56. Id.
57. See ETHICS AND ADVOCACY, supra note 14, at 11 (critics of conference recommendation in favor of
specialized ethics rules "claimed that the drafting of subcodes would be like having the fox guard the hen house,
because the very lawyers most involved in the specialties would be drafting their own codes of conduct").
58. For an example of where capital defenders were criticized for overreaching in their efforts to persuade a
client to attempt to avoid the death penalty by pleading guilty, see Williams v. Chrans, 742 F Supp. 472 (N.D.
Ill. 1990).
59. For cases where prosecutors perceived that capital defenders engaged in abusive motions practice, see
for example, State v. Huskey, 82 S.W.3d 297 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2002); Archuleta v. Galetka, 197 P.3d 650 (Utah
2008).
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address situations not ordinarily encountered by other lawyers. In any event,
professional reputational concerns seem unimportant as measured against the
interest in promoting sound professional conduct through effective professional
regulation.
Finally, some academics would oppose specialized ethics codes for an entirely
different reason: In their view, existing ethics rules already unduly constrain
lawyers' ethical discretion because the rules cover too much ground and are too
much like law. 60 Rather than stating general moral principles to encourage and
guide lawyers' exercise of independent moral judgment, the rules dictate
behavior, thereby tending to atrophy lawyers' ability to engage in moral
reasoning.61 Specialized codes would presumably constrain lawyers' discretion
even more. For some who favor enhancing individual self-regulation, this is
undesirable, because they assume that lawyers ordinarily make better decisions
about how to resolve ethical dilemmas by exercising independent professional
judgment rather than by applying ethics rules.62 To like effect, some believe that
lawyers should have more room to resolve ethics questions in light of their own
moral or religious values, rather than having to defer to professional values as
codified in ethics rules.63
Whatever the general merits of leaving lawyers' ethical decision-making
unburdened by rules-and both the bar and the judiciary reject this regulatory
strategy-the concept seems particularly inapt in the specialized setting of death
penalty defense. As noted previously, in this setting, the stakes are high but the
standard of practice has traditionally been low. 6 4 There is nothing in experience
60. See, e.g., David Luban & Michael Milleman, Good Judgment: Ethics Teaching in Dark Times, 9 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 31 (1995); Tanina Rostain, Ethics Lost: Limitations of Current Approaches to Lawyer Regulation,
71 S. CAL. L. REv. 1273 (1998); Maura Strassberg, Taking Ethics Seriously: Beyond Positivist Jurisprudence in
Legal Ethics, 80 IowAL. REv. 901 (1995).
61. See Ted Schneyer, Moral Philosophy's Standard Misconception of Legal Ethics, 1984 WIs. L. REv. 1529,
1538 (1984) (noting some philosophers' objection that "imposing an elaborate and comprehensive set of rules
on lawyers in the name of promoting ethical behavior is apt to backfire to undermine the individual lawyer's
sense of responsibility and cause her moral faculties to atrophy") (citing Gerald Postema, Moral Responsibility
in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 63 (1980)).
62. For a discussion of the distinction between lawyers' professional and personal judgment, and the
significance of the distinction in the context of professional regulation, see Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green,
Reconceptualizing Advocacy Ethics, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (2005).
63. See, e.g., Michael S. McGinniss, The Character of Codes: Preserving Spaces for Personal Integrity in
Lawyer Regulation, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 489, 566 (2016) ("The most fundamental reason to exercise
restraint when imposing specific mandates in lawyer regulation is to create space for individual lawyers to
integrate their personal, moral, and religious convictions with their professional lives."). For a discussion of
how ethics rules leave room for the expression of lawyers' personal values, see Bruce A. Green, The Role
of Personal Values in Professional Decisionmaking, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 19 (1997). For an expression of
skepticism that professional norms are frequently at odds with conventional social or religious norms, see Bruce
A. Green, The Religious Lawyering Critique, 21 J. L. & RELIGION 283 (2005 2006).
64. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text. For a recent disciplinary decision depicting death penalty
defense at its worst see In re Hawver, 339 P.3d 573 (Kan. 2014) (disbarring lawyer for unethical and
incompetent representation in death penalty case).
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to justify a prediction that death penalty defense lawyers will make better
decisions on their own than they would make with the benefit of court-adopted
ethics rules.
In sum, while it is easy to see why there is no constituency for specialized
ethics rules generally, or for specialized rules for death penalty lawyers in
particular, it is by no means clear that the reasons are compelling, when measured
against the public interest in effective professional regulation. Assuming that
courts can adopt rules that give clearer and better tailored guidance regarding
how defense lawyers should resolve professional dilemmas in death penalty
cases-and, in the absence of an attempt, one cannot discount the likelihood that
courts can achieve this-it is hard to see the advantage of uncertain and
incomplete provisions in codes of general applicability.
II. THE PRACTICAL VALUE OF SPECIALIZED RULES
A. A PROFESSIONAL DILEMMA UNDER THE CURRENT RULES
Part II examined the argument for specialized ethics rules for death penalty
defense lawyers in the abstract. The argument seems strong, and none of the
counter-arguments seem especially persuasive. But an unexamined assumption
underlying the abstract argument existed, namely, that the specialized ethics rules
would look different from the current, generalized rules-that is, that they would
address additional questions, and give either more precise or different answers. If
not, then specialized rules would serve no purpose. But, while one might intuit
that rules for death penalty defense lawyers will differ in some material respects
from the Model Rules, this is not a foregone conclusion. The concrete problem
proposed below, loosely based on a recent case,65 is designed to test the
assumption that the Model Rules do not adequately address death penalty
defense, and that there would therefore be a significant benefit to additional or
different rules.
Consider the dilemma of a lawyer who has been dispatched to meet with a
death-row inmate. The inmate unsuccessfully appealed his conviction and death
sentence and is now unrepresented. The defendant may now pursue federal
habeas relief, and doing so will both delay his execution and offer hope for
overturning his death sentence and perhaps even his conviction. However, the
one-year period within which to file for a writ of habeas corpus is coming to an
end, the inmate's mental state is deteriorating, and over the course of several
meetings, the inmate has been noncommittal about whether to accept the
lawyer's offer of help. At moments, the inmate has expressed despondency and a
wish to be allowed to die. At other times, the inmate has expressed a wish to live,
but it is unclear whether that translates into a desire to retain the lawyer and to
65. See infra notes 100-103 and accompanying text.
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authorize the lawyer to file a habeas petition. Should the lawyer file the habeas
petition she has prepared in order to preserve the inmate's options, or refrain,
because she has not been clearly authorized to do so? If the lawyer files a petition,
should she accompany it with a statement expressing doubt about her authority to
act for the inmate, explaining the circumstances and requesting the court's
approval?
One might argue that, to the extent this situation raises an ethical dilemma, the
lawyer should resolve it the way any other lawyer would resolve a similar
question regarding whether she has been retained and has authority to act for
another. But there are two problems with this argument: first, any lawyer facing
this sort of dilemma would find inadequate guidance in the existing ethics rules;
and second, it is not necessarily correct that the death penalty defense lawyer
should approach the question in the same way as a lawyer in a seemingly
analogous situation, such as that of a prospective lawyer for an indecisive or
uncommunicative individual who has an opportunity to file a civil lawsuit.66
To begin with, the Model Rules and equivalent state rules are both incomplete
and unclear. They do not include a provision setting forth a standard to govern
whether and when a lawyer-client relationship has been established so that the
lawyer may act at least to some extent as an agent on the client's behalf.67 The
ethics codes regard the formation of a lawyer-client relationship as essentially a
legal question governed by the common law of contract. 68 But it is a legal
question that must be answered for purposes of the ethics codes, because many of
the rules take a lawyer-client relationship as a starting point. A lawyer has some
authority to decide how to carry out the client's objectives, but that presupposes
that the lawyer has a client.69
Assuming a lawyer-client relationship exists, the rules do not specify all the
decisions that a lawyer may make over the client's objection or without the
client's express or implied consent. 70 The rules do say that a lawyer must defer to
66. For an example of how legal services lawyers deal with incapacitated individuals in eviction proceedings
and other emergency situations, see Mark Spiegel, The Story of Mr. G: Reflections upon the Questionably
Competent Client, 69 FORDHAM L. REv. 1179 (2000); see also Peter Margulies, Access, Connection, and Voice:
A Contextual Approach to Representing Senior Citizens of Questionable Capacity, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 1073,
1093 96 (1994); Jan E. Rein, Clients With Destructive and Socially Harmful Choices What's an Attorney to
Do?: Within and Beyond the Competency Construct, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 1101 (1994).
67. See, e.g., NYS Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Formal Op. 743 (2001) (referring to Restatement of
the Law Governing Lawyers for the standard establishing the formation of a lawyer-client relationship for
purposes of the confidentiality rule). Interestingly, the ABA Model Rules and state counterparts do define a
prospective client. See MODEL RULES R. 1.18(a) (a prospective client is "[a] person who consults with a lawyer
about the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship with respect to a matter"). However, this rule is of
no usefulness in the hypothetical scenario, because, while addressing conflicts of interest and confidentiality, it
provides no guidance regarding whether a lawyer is authorized to take protective action on behalf of a
death-row inmate who is a prospective client.
68. See, e.g., NYS Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Formal Op. 761 (2003).
69. See, e.g., MODEL RULES R. 1.2, cmts. 1 2.
70. See MODEL RULES R. 1.2 & cmt. 2.
[Vol. 29:527
ETHICS CODE FOR DEATH-PENALTY DEFENSE LAWYERS
the client's decision in a criminal case whether to plead guilty, testify, or waive a
jury trial.71 They do not say, however, what decisions a lawyer may make on her
own and, in particular, whether the criminal defense lawyer needs a client's
specific authorization to file a post-appeal motion. This is another situation where
the rules defer to other law. 72 Little help is afforded by judicial decisions
addressing the allocation of decision-making authority in the context of
constitutional challenges to the adequacy of counsel's performance, because the
question in ineffective assistance of counsel cases is whether the lawyer's
performance fell outside the range of reasonableness. Given the ethical and legal
ambiguity, lawyers' conduct will typically be upheld whether or not they defer to
the client's decision on questions other than those specifically entrusted to the
defendant by the Constitution.73
When a lawyer represents a sophisticated and articulate client, the lawyer
might seek to withdraw from the representation if the client deliberately refuses
to give clear, unequivocal instructions.74 But it is unclear whether a lawyer is
obligated to end the representation even in that situation, much less in the case of
a mentally ill client who is uncommunicative, irrational or equivocal. The rules
make allowances in cases involving clients whose capacity to make decisions
regarding the representation is diminished. For instance, Model Rule 1.14 allows
a lawyer to take protective action on behalf of a client with diminished mental
capacity, and allows emergency legal action on behalf of an incapacitated person
who cannot form a lawyer-client relationship.75 This suggests that, to some
extent, the lawyer may choose to represent the mentally ill client differently and
more paternalistically. But it is uncertain precisely how this rule would apply to a
lawyer's interaction with an inmate who may or may not be a client and whose
pending filing deadline in a death penalty case may or may not be regarded as an
emergency.
76
71. See MODEL RULES R. 1.2(a).
72. Comment 2 to Rule 1.2 of the Model Rules observes that the rule does not prescribe how lawyers should
resolve most disagreements with clients about the means to accomplish the lawyer's objectives, but that "[o]ther
law... may be applicable and should be consulted by the lawyer." MODEL RULES R. 1.2 cmt. 2. Presumably, the
"other law" will ordinarily be agency law, which itself provides no clear answers. MODEL RULES R. 1.2 cmt. 2.
73. Compare United States v. Masat, 896 F.2d 88 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that lawyer was not ineffective in
arguing ridiculous theories upon the defendant's insistence), and Foster v. Strickland, 707 F.2d 1339 (11 th Cir.
1983) (holding that lawyer was not ineffective in deferring to death penalty defendant's decision not to present
an insanity defense), and Nelson v. State, 21 P.3d 55 (Okla. 2001) (holding that, although the defendant's most
plausible defense was insanity, trial counsel was not ineffective in acceding to the defendant's decision not to
raise the defense), with Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983) (holding that appellate lawyer was not required to
accede to the defendant's request to raise particular non-frivolous arguments); State v. Davis, 506 A.2d 86
(Conn. 1986) (holding that trial lawyer was not constitutionally required to call a witness whom the defendant
instructed him to call).
74. See MODEL RULES R. 1.16.
75. See MODEL RULES R. 1.14(b); see also MODEL RULES R. 1.14 cmt. 9.
76. See infra note 99.
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Wholly apart from the uncertainty regarding how the existing rules apply
either in the death penalty defense lawyer's situation or in analogous situations,
one can question whether one-size-fits-all rules should apply here. Assuming we
know how the rules apply when a lawyer is uncertain whether a client wants to
file a civil complaint before the statute of limitations runs, should the same rule
apply to a death penalty case, or should the lawyer have greater leeway? One
reason for a more lenient standard is that the inmate's life is at stake: as courts
have recognized with regard to other procedural questions, "death is different,"
and the difference calls for greater assurance that the adjudicative process is fair
and reliable.7 7 The difference has implications for defense lawyers' professional
obligations. 78 The lawyer may have greater latitude to advocate on the client's
behalf, overriding the client's self-destructive preferences, because of the
importance of vigorous advocacy in ensuring the fairness and reliability of the
conviction and death sentence. 79 This may be true especially when the capital
defendant is mentally ill and incommunicative.8 0 As to other aspects of a capital
defense, such as conducting pretrial investigation, a death penalty defense lawyer
is not only permitted but also constitutionally obligated to override the
defendant's contrary and self-destructive instructions; therefore, the idea of
acting in the capital defendant's best interest, in derogation of his autonomy
interest, is not foreign.8 1
Further, in post-conviction capital proceedings, greater leeway to act on
uncertain authority may compensate for the unusual impediments to clarifying
what the inmate wants. The lawyer's access to the inmate may be impeded
because an inmate imprisoned on death row cannot meet or speak freely; further,
depending on the inmate's mental state, which incarceration typically erodes, the
inmate may not respond clearly and decisively.8 2 In other situations, the lawyer
may be able to rely on others for help in ascertaining the prospective client's
77. See, e.g., Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357 358 (1977); see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972).
78. See, e.g., Marshall v. Cathel, 428 F.3d 452, 467 (3d Cir. 2005).
79. See, e.g., Robertson v. Florida, 143 So.3d 907 (Fla. 2014) (finding it proper to deny appellate lawyer's
motion to withdraw from representing defendant in capital case, and to require the lawyer to continue the
appeal, even though the defendant wished to argue in favor of his death sentence).
80. See, e.g., Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 174 (2004) (holding that the trial lawyer for mentally ill,
incommunicative defendant in death penalty case may undertake strategy of admitting guilt, if the lawyer
believes that is in the client's best interest, even absent the client's express consent); see also ABA Capital
Defense Guidelines, supra note 19, at 1009 10 ("Some clients will initially insist that they want to be
executed as punishment or because they believe they would rather die than spend the rest of their lives in
prison; some clients will want to contest their guilt but not present mitigation. It is ineffective assistance for
counsel to simply acquiesce to such wishes, which usually reflect the distorting effects of overwhelming
feelings of guilt and despair rather than a rational decision in favor of a state-assisted suicide.").
81. See ABA Capital Defense Guidelines, supra note 19, at 1021 n.206.
82. See id. at 1082 ("[T]he mental condition ofmany capital clients will deteriorate the longer they remain on
death row. This may result in suicidal tendencies and/or impairments in realistic perception and rational
decision-making.").
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wishes, or the court may appoint someone else to make decisions for the
incapacitated individual. Neither is likely to be true in the case of a death-row
inmate, however.
Within the framework of the rules, it is unclear how the death-penalty lawyer
should resolve the posed dilemma. The Preamble to the Model Rules observes
that:
Virtually all difficult ethical problems arise from conflict between a lawyer's
responsibilities to clients, to the legal system and to the lawyer's own interest in
remaining an ethical person while earning a satisfactory living .... Such issues
must be resolved through the exercise of sensitive professional and moral
judgment guided by the basic principles underlying the Rules. 83
The dilemma at issue here is one that implicates a constellation of competing
public and professional values and therefore calls for just such a sensitive
professional and moral judgment, taking account of all the relevant facts and
relevant ethics principles.
Most importantly, the inmate himself has competing interests. His interests in
life and liberty generally weigh in favor of the lawyer's pursuit of legal relief
even with questionable authorization, but at the same time, the inmate's interest
in avoiding a torturous existence on death row weighs against initiating possibly
unwanted proceedings that will prolong his confinement by delaying his
execution. Ordinarily, if the inmate made a reasoned choice between these
interests, the decision would be entitled to respect. That is to say, the inmate has
an interest in decision-making autonomy that may be paramount in dealing with
the lawyer. But that interest does not dictate how to resolve the lawyer's dilemma,
because it is unclear what decision the inmate is making, and because the
inmate's diminished mental capacity, exacerbated by prison conditions, may
make his pronouncements or silence untrustworthy. Based on his interactions
with the inmate, the lawyer may have an intuition about what the client wants, but
may not be able to articulate the factual predicate for this intuition.
Taking into account only the competing interests of the mentally ill death-row
inmate, it is uncertain how a lawyer should resolve ambiguity about what the
inmate wants. Must the prospective client express an unambiguous decision to
retain counsel to file papers, or may the lawyer act on less, and, if so, how much
less? It may seem anomalous to think that mentally ill individuals can be tried for
capital murder (because the due process standard of competence to stand trial is
low 8 4), but that once convicted, they cannot seek post-conviction review because
their mental illness undermines their ability to retain and direct counsel. That an
83. MODEL RULES, pmbl. 9.
84. See Michael Mello, The Non-Trial of the Century: Representations of the Unabomber, 24 VT. L. REv.
417, 466 (2000) ("The legal test for mental competence to stand trial is low: understanding of the charges and
the legal proceedings, and ability to aid in one's own defense.").
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inmate does not express, and adhere to, a decision to have a petition filed on his
behalf, does not necessarily mean that the inmate does not want the lawyer to
pursue further legal relief. The inmate's occasional willingness to meet with the
lawyer may be evidence of a desire to obtain the lawyer's help. If the inmate
appears to vacillate, to which decision at which moment in time should the
lawyer defer? Further, if there are additional opportunities for the lawyer to meet
with the inmate and to develop a relationship of trust, the inmate may later be
persuaded to ratify whatever interest he expressed earlier in keeping the case, and
himself, alive.8 5 Given that the inmate's life is at stake, some will have the
instinctual reaction that if the mentally ill inmate is otherwise unrepresented and
the filing deadline is looming, the lawyer should be able to act on virtually any
expression of interest in her services by filing a substantive motion and, certainly,
by requesting an extension of time.
The judiciary and the public also have competing interests at stake in this
scenario. The courts have an interest in access to justice, which includes
correcting significant trial error. The public has a related interest in ensuring that
the criminal process is fair before putting a defendant to death. These weigh in
favor of allowing the lawyer to bring claims on behalf of the inmate, even if the
lawyer's agency is uncertain.8 6 Otherwise, the judiciary may lose the opportunity
to correct procedural defects, some of which may not have been evident to, or
able to be remedied by, the trial court-for example, the prosecution's
suppression of evidence or the defense lawyer's ineffective assistance. But there
is also a judicial and public interest in finality and in the conservation of judicial
resources, both of which weigh against allowing capital defense lawyers to
initiate proceedings in which the nominal client is uninterested.
There are also competing judicial and public interests around the question of
whether the lawyer should disclose her dilemma to the court so that it can decide
whether the lawyer has adequate authority to proceed on the inmate's behalf.
87
Disclosure would promote the interest in an objective, judicial resolution of what
may be a difficult legal and ethical question, rather than leaving it to the lawyer to
resolve. However, the interests and values underlying the attorney-client
privilege and the professional duty of confidentiality weigh against disclosure.
85. Cf ABA Capital Defense Guidelines, supra note 19, at 1085 ("Collateral counsel has the same obligation
as trial and appellate counsel to establish a relationship of trust with the client. But by the time a case reaches
this stage, the client will have put his life into the hands of at least one other lawyer and found himself on death
row. Counsel should not be surprised if the client initially exhibits some hostility and lack of trust, and must
endeavor to overcome these barriers.").
86. See, e.g., Robertson v. Florida, 143 So. 3d 907, 912 13 (Fla. 2014) (Pariente, J., concurring) ("[A] high
degree of certainty in procedural fairness as well as substantive proportionality must be maintained in order to
insure that the death penalty is administered evenhandedly.' . . . This is actually of particular concern when the
defendant expresses a desire to be executed because 'it is not necessarily those most deserving of the death
penalty (e.g., the most aggravated and least mitigated) who seek its imposition."') (internal citations omitted).
87. Cf Virzi v. Grand Trunk Warehouse & Cold Storage Co., 571 F Supp. 507, 509 12 (E.D. Mich. 1983)
(holding that a lawyer must disclose the death of a party whom the lawyer represents).
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The inmate's trust in this lawyer and any other lawyers may be eroded if the
lawyer discloses her dilemma to the court. Future clients might be discouraged
from trusting lawyers if word were to spread about a lawyer who, after meeting
with a death-row defendant, disclosed their conversation to the court without any
prompting.
Finally, the lawyer has professional and personal interests at stake that may or
may not be worthy of respect. If the lawyer has chosen to make her career as a
death penalty defense lawyer, she almost certainly has a political or humanitarian
interest in serving capital defendants and trying to prevent their execution. This
lawyer will have a strong impulse to resolve uncertainty in favor of trying to
delay or prevent the inmate's execution. At the same time, the lawyer has an
interest in her own professional reputation and license. This may weigh in favor
of taking the course of action that is the least professionally risky, whatever that
may be. The lawyer's reputation in the larger professional community may be
served by professional caution, but her reputation among peers-the subgroup of
death penalty defense lawyers-may be better served by taking professional risks
to serve the legal interests of death-row inmates.
B. THE DUBIOUS VIRTUES OF PRESERVING THE UNCERTAINTY ARISING
UNDER THE GENERALIZED RULES
One's initial reaction might be that the lawyer's dilemma whether to file a
habeas petition on behalf of an ambivalent or unexpressive death-row inmate
proves the virtue of the Model Rules and state counterparts: the rules seemingly
leave it to the lawyer to decide what to do. The lawyer has little choice but to
decide what to do on her own. In effect, the rules require the lawyer to do what
she thinks is best.
There are understandable reasons why, in certain situations, professional
conduct rules might explicitly or implicitly leave decisions to lawyers' discre-
tion.88 Those reasons do not seem particularly compelling in this death-penalty
scenario, however.
First, there are some situations in which a lawyer's autonomy interest
outweighs public interests that might justify regulation. For example, this
explains why, absent a court appointment (as occurs in most criminal cases),
lawyers may decide for themselves whether to accept a representation. 89
Although there are relevant public interests, such as the interests in expanding the
availability of legal services and in preventing discrimination in how legal
services are allocated, the lawyer is thought to have a paramount interest, as a
88. See Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Permissive Rules of Professional Conduct, 91 MINN. L. REV.
265 (2006) [hereinafter Green & Zacharias, Permissive Rules].
89. See MODEL RULES R. 6.1; MONROE FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 70 (4th
ed. 2010).
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matter of personal and professional autonomy, in deciding for whom to work.90
This autonomy interest might go part of the way toward explaining why the
Model Rules provide limited guidance in the death penalty scenario: a lawyer
should have freedom to decline to represent the inmate in post-conviction
proceedings who fails to express adequate enthusiasm for the representation, at
least if the lawyer clearly conveys her decision to the inmate 91 and does not
impede the inmate's ability to secure other counsel. But the lawyer's personal
interests are not important enough to justify allowing the lawyer unregulated
discretion to initiate proceedings against an inmate's wishes. The interests of the
inmate, the judiciary and the public, however conflicting they may be, will almost
certainly be paramount.
Further, there are sometimes regulatory justifications for allowing lawyers
discretion to make their own ethical choices. For example, regulators may not
agree on an answer because there may be compelling arguments in favor of
92different line-drawing alternatives. Other reasons for giving lawyers discretion
to resolve an ethical dilemma within broad limits include the difficulty of drafting
a rule that adequately captures the profession's intuitions, and that the optimal
standard would be difficult or unfair to enforce because it would turn on
subjective considerations or on contestable facts. 93 If rule drafters sought to guide
death row defenders who are called on to translate the uncertain and ambivalent
expression of clients and would-be clients, it is conceivable that the drafters
could not do substantially better than to leave it to the lawyers to decide what is
best to do. But the regulatory rationales plainly do not justify the existing ethics
90. See, e.g., Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer- Client Relation,
85 YALE L. J. 1060, 1078 79 (1976); William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REv.
1083, 1096 (1988).
91. Absent clarity, the lawyer may create a lawyer-client relationship inadvertently. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE LAw GOVERNING LAWYERS § 14 (2000).
92. This may explain, at least in part, why lawyers have discretion to decide whether to disclose client
confidences to prevent or rectify certain harms. See, e.g., MODEL RULES R. 1.6(b)(1) (3). In many concrete
situations, lawyers would reasonably disagree whether the interests in disclosure or confidentiality are
paramount. The relevant interests are those of the public, not the individual lawyer, but there is disagreement
how competing public interests should be resolved. Giving more discretion to lawyers is one way of allowing
the profession and judiciary to avoid having to make a choice as to which there would be significant opposition.
See Green & Zacharias, Permissive Rules, supra note 88, at 313; see also Fred C. Zacharias, The Future
Structure and Regulation of Law Practice: Confronting Lies, Fictions, and False Paradigms in Legal Ethics
Regulation, 44 ARIZ. L. REv. 829, 830 (2002).
93. These may further explain rules giving lawyers discretion to disclose confidences to prevent or rectify
certain harms. See Green & Zacharias, Permissive Rules, supra note 88. For example, in deciding whether to
disclose a client's threat to substantially injure another, it would be relevant to consider the credibility of the
threat, the likelihood that the client could successfully carry it out, the extent of the threatened harm, the likely
consequences to the client and to the lawyer-client relationship of revealing it, and the extent to which the
lawyer's future clients and other lawyers' clients would mistrust lawyers if disclosure were made. It would be
difficult to draft a standard that articulates how a lawyer should weigh these considerations, and a later
disciplinary authority that was called on to second-guess the lawyer could never perfectly put itself in the
lawyer's shoes.
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rules' silence, because there is no evidence that rule drafters ever thought about
the problem and tried to offer more direction.
Finally, some may posit that the lawyer will make better decisions if she is
forced to resolve her ethical dilemma on her own rather than having to follow a
legally enforceable ethics rule. The theory might be that the lawyer herself will
derive and apply a better standard of conduct than whatever one would be
incorporated in a rule. Alternatively, the theory may be that the process of having
to resolve an ethical dilemma without direction from an enforceable rule will help
the lawyer develop sensitivity to ethics issues and greater sophistication in
resolving them, which will benefit her future work. The death-penalty hypotheti-
cal challenges these arguments. Fraught decisions like whether to continue to
litigate on behalf of a death-row inmate or let the inmate march along to the
execution chamber seems best not made in a vacuum. Although the ideal legal
standard may be a relaxed and permissive one, that would seem preferable to
leaving the lawyer free to make a decision without any limitations and without
any obligation whatsoever to seek guidance from others or from professional
standards.94
C. THE PROBLEM WITH UNCERTAINTY
Even if one were to conclude that lawyers should be allowed additional leeway
to decide whether it is permissible to file for post-conviction relief on behalf of a
death-row inmate who has not clearly authorized her to do so, that is not the
current state of the ethics rules and law. The rules leave the lawyers' proper
course uncertain for regulatory purposes. The problem is that uncertainty about
what kind of decision to make is not the same as permission to make any decision
the lawyer wishes. In failing to establish a clear standard of conduct, the Model
Rules simply leave the lawyer in a dilemma unassisted, putting her at risk of
violating a disciplinary rule no matter which way she responds.
Suppose that, after meeting with the inmate on more than one occasion, and
just as the filing deadline is about to expire, the lawyer decides not to file a habeas
petition because she concludes that the inmate has not been clear enough in
engaging her and authorizing her to act. The risk is that, after the filing deadline
expires, the inmate will authorize another lawyer to pursue post-conviction
remedies. The next lawyer will seek to excuse the inmate's failure to meet the
habeas filing deadline. The obvious, and perhaps only, available argument for
equitable tolling of the filing deadline will be that the first lawyer was grossly
negligent or unethical. 95 The inmate (through counsel) will undoubtedly argue
94. See Green, Developing Standards, supra note 18, at 1099 2000 (discussing how well-intentioned
lawyers may make the best professional decisions among available legal and ethical options).
95. See Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912 (2012); Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010); see generally
Marni von Wilpert, Comment, Holland v. Florida: A Prisoner's Last Chance, Attorney Error, and the
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that he gave adequate authorization and, relying on the lawyer to file in time,
never sought other counsel. Regardless of what actually transpired, the inmate
will have substantial latitude in his recollection and characterization of his earlier
conversations with the lawyer, since those conversations would have been
unrecorded. Out of concern for the inmate's interests, the lawyer may decide not
to dispute the inmate's assertion that he was retained to file a habeas petition.
Even though the factual record may be incomplete, experts and amici may
support the inmate's claim by attacking the lawyer's conduct.96 If a later court
finds the inmate's complaint to be credible, a disciplinary investigation may
follow, on the theory that the lawyer failed to act competently, failed to carry out
the client's objectives, and failed to proceed diligently and promptly.97 By
declining to file a petition on behalf of an ambivalent death-row defendant, the
lawyer will face a risk of professional discipline.98
As an alternative, the lawyer may file a habeas petition protectively-that is,
both to protect the inmate's post-conviction procedural rights and to protect the
lawyer against a later claim of incompetence. 99 This might seem to be the
cautious approach, but recent events show that it has perils of its own. The inmate
may later complain that the lawyer acted unethically by filing the habeas petition
without permission. Recently, the Supreme Court received a complaint of this
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act's One- Year Statute of Limitations Period for Federal Habeas
Corpus Review, 79 FORDHAM L. REv. 1429 (2010).
96. See, e.g., Brief of Legal Ethics Professors and Practitioners et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioner, Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912 (2012) (No. 10-63), 2011 WL 2132708.
97. MODEL RULES R. 1.1, 1.2 & 1.3. A savvy lawyer may write a long letter to the client and/or to the file
explaining why she is not filing the federal habeas petition, but this is no guarantee against a complaint and an
adverse fact finding.
98. For a decision disciplining a lawyer for failing to file a post-conviction petition on a death-row inmate's
behalf, see In re Hunoval, 247 S.E.2d 230 (N.C. 1977), which held that a lawyer wrongfully withdrew from the
representation.
99. A comment to ABA Model Rule 1.14 ("Client With Diminished Capacity") provides mild support for this
approach even if there are serious doubts whether the inmate has engaged the lawyer. The black-letter rule itself,
although affording lawyers leeway in limited circumstances to act protectively on behalf of mentally
incapacitated clients, would not apply absent a lawyer-client relationship. However, Comment 9 to the rule
provides that:
In an emergency, where the ... safety... of a person with seriously diminished capacity is threatened
with imminent and irreparable harm, a lawyer may take legal action on behalf of such a person even
though the person is unable to establish a client-lawyer relationship or to make or express considered
judgments about the matter, when the person or another acting in good faith on the person's behalf has
consulted with the lawyer.
MODEL RULES R. 1.14 cmt. 9. The Comment was added, based on recommendations of a conference on ethical
issues in representing older clients, in order to allow lawyers to act for vulnerable, incapacitated clients in
emergency situations such as where an incapacitated person's home will be foreclosed absent immediate legal
intervention. See Paul R. Tremblay, Impromptu Lawyering andDe Facto Guardians, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1429,
1431 (1994). It is debatable, however, whether there is any basis in Rule 1.14 or other law for lawyers to act for
incapacitated non-clients in emergency situations. It would also be debatable whether the death-row inmate's
situation is an emergency of the sort covered by the Comment.
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nature from a mentally ill death-row inmate after a Pennsylvania lawyer filed an
allegedly unauthorized cert petition in the inmate's case. l00 The accusation was
that the lawyer falsely represented that the inmate authorized him to file the
petition.10 1 Rather than simply accepting the lawyer's word that he had acted
with authority, 102 the Supreme Court referred the lawyer to the state disciplinary
agency,10 3 which, having received a referral from the nation's highest federal
court, would undoubtedly feel constrained to commence an investigation.
A third alternative available to the lawyer would be to accompany a habeas
petition with a confession by the lawyer that she is uncertain about her authority
to file. The lawyer could be straightforward in the declaration that her
conversations with the client are privileged, but try to explain her dilemma in
general terms: she believes serious mental health issues have contributed to the
client's failure to give unequivocal affirmative consent to file a petition and that
she is ethically obligated, in an abundance of caution, to file a protective petition.
This may win points for candor, but it is not necessarily ideal from an ethics and
disciplinary perspective. Unlike the situation where the lawyer doubts the
criminal defendant's competence to stand trial, 10 4 this is not a situation where
courts have authorized or required lawyers to raise competence concerns with the
court notwithstanding the duty of confidentiality. There is no established
procedure for entering an appearance of counsel while raising doubts about one's
own authority to do so. The confession of uncertainty may be regarded as a
breach of the confidentiality duty, which applies to any information, not just
privileged information, learned in a current or prospective lawyer-client relation-
ship. 105 The confession also undermines the putative client's interest in securing
habeas relief and may therefore be disloyal. At the same time, based on her own
statement, the lawyer can be accused of acting without proper authority if the
court concludes the inmate was not a client or that the lawyer did not have the
inmate's consent to file the petition.
The disciplinary risk posed by each of the three alternatives illustrates why the
uncertainty of the Model Rules is often problematic from a regulatory perspec-
tive. The lawyer may be influenced to make the choice that seems to afford the
lowest disciplinary risk rather than the choice that appears best from the public's
100. Letter from Michael E. Ballard to the U.S. Supreme Court (June 2, 2014), http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.
com/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Ballard-file-Part-I1.pdf [https:Ilperma.cc/V338-Q55S].
101. Id.
102. Letter from Marc Bookman, to Scott S. Harris, Office of the Clerk of the U.S. Supreme Court (July 8,
2014), http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Ballard-file-Part-Il.pdf [https://perma.cc/
V338-Q55S].
103. Order List, U.S. Supreme Court (Aug. 11, 2014), http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/
0811 l4zr_8mj8.pdf [https://perma.cc/QLN5-2LAJ].
104. See ABA STANDARD FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 7-4.2 (2d ed. 1986); see generally Rodney J. Uphoff, The
Role of the Criminal Defense Lawyer in Representing the Mentally Impaired Client: Zealous Advocate or
Officer of the Court?, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 65 (1988).
105. See MODELRULES R.1.6 & 1.18.
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perspective. It is hard to envision this as the best of all possible regulatory
approaches.
D. THE VIRTUES OF SPECIALIZED RULES
The dilemma of a death penalty defense lawyer whose agency is uncertain
illustrates the potential utility of specialized rules. Assuming that a judicial and
professional consensus could be developed around some standard of conduct,
codifying that standard in a specialized ethics rule would promote optimal
professional conduct, while relieving lawyers of the anxiety that comes with
disciplinary risk in areas of uncertainty. If capital defenders do not know how to
act when their agency is uncertain, they are likely to act inconsistently with how
courts, as ultimate arbiters of legal ethics, believe these lawyers should act. When
lawyers guess wrong, they may undermine the interests of the death-row inmate,
the judiciary, and the public. They are likely to experience anxiety about how best
to act when this situation confronts them and to risk professional opprobrium and
sanction for acting in good faith, but erroneously, in a difficult situation. No one
benefits when the ethics codes sow uncertainty, particularly when each of the
alternative courses of conduct poses professional risks. In other words, ethical
clarity is preferable to uncertainty, at least in this situation, and a specialized rule
could afford greater clarity.
One might argue that ethics rule drafters should provide guidance, not by
adopting a special rule for criminal defense practice, or for death-penalty defense
practice, but by adopting a one-size-fits-all rule for lawyers who are uncertain
about their agency. In most cases, adopting a general rule will be the preferable
drafting strategy when a problem cuts across a range of practice settings. In such
situations, many lawyers, not just specialists or sub-specialists, would benefit
from guidance. There is ordinarily no reason for different practitioners to be held
to different standards, and generally applicable rules reduce the risk of regulatory
capture by a particular segment of the bar. But a generally applicable rule may be
undesirable in this instance if one concludes that the capital defense context calls
for a different approach because death penalty advocacy is different. That is, the
justification for resolving ambiguity in favor of intervening on behalf of a
mentally incapacitated individual is more compelling when the individual faces
the death penalty than when he is at risk of relinquishing a civil claim for
monetary damages.
If one is convinced by this example about the utility of at least one specialized
rule for death penalty defense lawyers, the next question is whether there should
be an ethics code for capital defense containing a collection of specialized ethics
rules. This depends on how many distinctive ethics problems arise in this area of
practice. Death penalty defense lawyers may face distinctive professional
questions because procedural aspects of this practice, including the capital
sentencing stage and post-conviction exoneration proceedings, are contextually
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unique or because the roles of these lawyers and those acting at their direction,
such as mitigation specialists, differ from the roles that lawyers ordinarily
serve. 106 Because the stakes are so high, these lawyers may also face questions
that are addressed by generally-applicable rules but that should be resolved
differently in capital cases. 107 Additionally, death penalty defense lawyers and,
ultimately, their clients may benefit if the court adopted rules that provide
detailed guidance regarding some professional duties (such as the competence
and consultation duties), which are too vaguely addressed by existing rules.1 O8
If there are enough fraught and consequential dilemmas like the question of
how to deal with uncertain agency where more guidance would be helpful, then
perhaps these questions should be answered in a specialized code. In all
likelihood, this would not be an entirely different set of ethics rules but rather
additional rules that supplement, interpret and, in exceptional instances, super-
sede the general rules. These rules would clarify the application of the general
rules to death penalty defense, fill in gaps where the existing rules are silent, and
106. For example, death-penalty standards urge lawyers to contact the victim's family to seek its support for
a plea bargain that avoids the death sentence. ABA Capital Defense Guidelines, supra note 19, at 1042. But
lawyers may be sanctioned for efforts to secure support for leniency from the victim's family, if the lawyers'
efforts are regarded as "prejudicial to the administration of justice." See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Machin, 635 So.2d
938 (Fla. 1994). But see Conn. Bar Ass'n Standing Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Informal Op. 15-05 (2015),
http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.ctbar.org/resource/resmgr/Ethics-Opinions/CBA-Informal-Opinion-15-05-.
PDF [https://perma.cc/JA2N-VNHW] (last visited April 1, 2016). Professional conduct rules might draw clearer
lines between permissible and punishable conduct in capital cases, to provide assurance that the efforts urged in
the professional standards will not subject lawyers to sanction under the rules.
107. For example, death penalty advocates have been encouraged to raise all potential legal issues and
preserve all conceivable errors for appellate and post-conviction review. See ABA Capital Defense Guidelines,
supra note 19, at 1030 32 ("Because of the possibility that the client will be sentenced to death, counsel must be
significantly more vigilant about litigating all potential issues at all levels in a capital case than in any other
case."). This may suggest that Model Rule 3.1, which subjects a lawyer to discipline for making a frivolous
argument, should be relaxed for death-penalty defense lawyers in order to avoid chilling legitimate advocacy in
death penalty cases. See MODEL RULES R. 3.1. Further, death penalty trial advocates have been instructed that, as
a matter of loyalty, they are professionally obligated to provide assistance to successor appellate counsel, even
at their own reputational expense. See ABA Capital Defense Guidelines, supra note 19, at 1074 78 (citing, inter
alia, State Bar of Cal. Standing Comm. on Prof'l Responsibility & Conduct, Formal Op. 1992-127 (1992)). This
may suggest the need to supplement Rule 1.16(d), which might be read to suggest that once appellate counsel
has taken over, the trial lawyer's job is done. See generally Lara A. Bazelon, The Long Goodbye: After the
Innocence Movement, Does the Attorney-Client Relationship Ever End?, 106 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
(forthcoming).
108. For example, existing rules provide that the criminal defendant must receive advice "reasonably
necessary" to make an "informed decision" whether to plead guilty. MODEL RULES R. 1.2(a) & 1.4(b). Given the
stakes, death-penalty advocates might benefit from more detailed guidance on what information is reasonably
necessary, as well as about how forcefully the lawyers may seek to persuade the defendant, given the impulse to
discourage the defendant from making a fatal decision. Cf ABA Capital Defense Guidelines, supra note 19, at
1046 ("Counsel's role is to ensure that the choice is as well considered as possible. This may require counsel to
work diligently over time to overcome the client's natural resistance to the idea of standing in open court,
admitting to guilt, and perhaps agreeing to permanent imprisonment. Or it may require counsel to do everything
possible to prevent a depressed or suicidal client from pleading guilty where such a plea could result in an
avoidable death sentence.").
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perhaps modify some of the general rules when they are not well suited to the
particular work of death penalty defense lawyers. If there were only a handful of
distinctive ethics problems, however, then perhaps the addition of a few
specialized rules to the existing code would suffice.
E. ANSWERS TO CONVENTIONAL OBJECTIONS
A specialized rule may be useful for death penalty defense lawyers who seek to
serve mentally ill clients in that it might provide guidance about how best to deal
with the dilemma of uncertain agency. Clearer guidance may serve the interests
of death-row inmates, the judiciary and the public, as well as lawyers themselves.
This may not in itself answer all of the predictable objections to specialized ethics
rules identified in Part II. But if one were to propose drafting and adopting a rule
for death penalty defense lawyers who are uncertain about their authority to act
for a mentally ill inmate, the objections do not seem especially compelling.
For example, it is hard to imagine that a specialized rule, or set of specialized
rules, for capital defenders will make inroads into the concept of a unified
profession, whatever value one may ascribe to the idea.109 Death penalty
advocates would still be governed, for the most part, by the ordinary ethics rules.
The specialized rules would simply suggest that these lawyers need greater
clarity about how the rules apply in the particular context in which they work.
This is no secret. It is the rationale for bar association ethics opinions and
standards. Nor does a specialized rule or code necessarily defy the ordinary
preference for general rules. Not every area of practice necessitates its own set of
ethics rules. Further, specialized rules would presumably not be written on a
blank slate but would build on the generally-applicable ethics rules.
Some might argue that the rules about how death penalty defense lawyers
should act when their agency can be challenged should remain vague, taking the
position that it would be preferable for future courts, disciplinary agencies or
others to provide guidance. For example, courts can issue opinions interpreting
the rules in concrete cases in which death penalty defense lawyers encounter this
problem. Leaving questions unanswered is often a legitimate regulatory ap-
proach. Many ethics rules are vague or ambiguous by design. 110 Many questions
are best answered by the courts in adjudication, or by others, rather than by rule
drafters, and the Model Rules acknowledge this. 1 1 But leaving this particular
question unresolved seems undesirable because, as experience shows, courts and
109. See Wilkins, Making Context Count, supra note 25, at 1219 ("[A] middle-level approach is unlikely to
lead to the disintegration of the profession. There will still be many issues of common concern for example,
preserving honesty and competence in the profession as a whole.").
110. See, e.g., MODEL RULES R.1.5(a) (forbidding unreasonable legal fees); see also MODEL RULES R. 8.4(d)
(forbidding conduct that is "prejudicial to the administration of justice").
111. See, e.g., MODEL RULES R. 1.2 cmt.2; MODEL RULES R. 4.4 cmt. 2; see Leslie C. Levin, The Emperor's
Clothes and Other Tales About the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Discipline Sanctions, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1,
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other bodies have never had the occasion to address and publicly resolve it, and
perhaps never will. For example, in the case of the death penalty defense lawyer
whom the Supreme Court referred to state disciplinary authorities for allegedly
filing an unauthorized cert petition, there may never be a public decision
explaining the resolution. If the disciplinary authority decides that there was no
disciplinary violation, it need never explain why or enunciate the underlying
standard of conduct governing its decision. 112
Another concern with specialized ethics rules and standards might be that they
interfere with lawyers' independent professional judgment; some academics
might share that concern. But a specialized rule can also do the very opposite: it
can carve out an area of professional discretion and protect it. As noted in an
earlier article:
Particularly when lawyers lack certainty about how to proceed in a given case,
a rule can give lawyers leeway or place them on a razor's edge .... [O]ne
function of 'permissive' rules of professional conduct-that is, rules that say a
lawyer 'may' engage in conduct but that implicitly authorize lawyers not to
engage in the particular conduct-is to give lawyers wiggle room, a space
where they will not be disciplined no matter how they act as long as they act in
good faith. 
1 13
In this instance, it seems likely that the preferable rule will be one that
establishes the lawyer's broad discretion to act on less than clear authorization to
preserve a mentally ill inmate's procedural rights that might otherwise be lost. In
other words, the lawyer should have room to decide whether or not to act without
running the risk of discipline. A permissive rule could also resolve legal
uncertainties aside from those in the ethics rules, insofar as the lawyer might be at
risk of violating relevant procedural rules or agency law standards that are
unclear about how the lawyer should behave. The courts would have latitude to
interpret the other law consistent with whatever authorization is provided in a
specialized ethics rule.
Courts' principal objection to specialized ethics rules for death penalty defense
lawyers is that developing the rules would require too much effort to benefit too
few lawyers and clients. By definition, specialized rules would relate to only a
subgroup of lawyers. Death penalty defense lawyers are a subgroup of the
7 n.29 (1998) ("codes of conduct governing lawyers tend to be vague and general, making it difficult to
determine what conduct is unacceptable in certain practice settings").
112. In Pennsylvania, unless a formal complaint is filed, disciplinary proceedings are confidential. See PA.
Disc. BD. RULES & PROCEDURES, § 93 (F) (2015).
113. Bruce A. Green, Criminal Defense Lawyering at the Edge: A Look Back, 36 HOFSTRA L. REv. 353,
391 92 (2007) (citing Green & Zacharias, Permissive Rules, supra note 88, at 300); see also Richard W. Painter,
Toward a Market for Lawyer Disclosure Services: In Search of Optimal Whistleblowing Rules, 63 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 221, 224 (1995) ("Allowing lawyers to choose their own rules, in effect to make their own disclosure
warranties, would permit lawyers to decide which rules best suit their practice, their clients, and their ethical
beliefs.").
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subgroup of criminal defense lawyers. These few lawyers may encounter
problems of uncertain agency only on rare occasions. Precisely because it is a
hard problem, considerable effort would be required to win consensus around a
standard. Precisely because the standard may be nuanced, and will have to take
account of various relevant facts, it may be hard to codify. It seems infinitely
easier for a court to deal with the problem when it is presented, if that day ever
comes. To be sure, courts would benefit from having a rule on which to draw
when the time comes. But for judges, the benefits will not seem to be worth the
effort. However valuable a rule might be for death-row defendants and their
lawyers, the interest in judicial economy is often paramount.
This institutional argument seems unpersuasive and perhaps even unworthy.
Although overseeing adjudication is the judiciary's principal responsibility,
another responsibility is to regulate lawyers, including by adopting professional
conduct rules. Historically, state judiciaries have been jealous of this prerogative.
But with the power to regulate lawyers comes a responsibility to exercise the
power in the most effective manner, not to shirk. Insofar as judiciaries decline to
take charge of rule-drafting, one might suggest that it is the judges themselves
who have limited the judiciary's rule-making function, acting at the expense of
the greater public good to promote their self-interest in reducing their own
workload.
CONCLUSION: OTHER WAYS TO MITIGATE THE PROBLEM THAT SPECIALIZED
RULES AND CODES WOULD ADDRESS
Regardless of one's conclusion as to the utility of specialized ethics rules and
codes, the foregoing discussion points to a regulatory problem: there are areas of
professional conduct where lawyers-particularly those working in specialized
legal practices-do not have adequate guidance about how to resolve ethics
problems. These lawyers face disciplinary and other legal risks because of the
vagueness, uncertainty, or incompleteness of the ethics rules. Further, in some of
these areas, acting cautiously does not avoid the problem, because lawyers are
pushed in different directions, facing risks whichever way they go. Ideally, the
problem would be addressed by additional, clearer rules that are tailored to
the relevant areas of legal practice, including, in some cases by rules that give
lawyers some discretion or permission in light of factual or legal complexities.
Such rules would provide some protection from professional sanction as well as
from civil liability and reputational risk by establishing a standard of reasonable
professional practice that gives lawyers breathing room.
Experience shows, however, that bar associations are unlikely to draft and
propose the necessary rules, and courts are unlikely to encourage their creation or
adopt them on their own. There is no significant constituency within the bench
and bar for specialized ethics rules. But that does not mean that the problem is
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insoluble. Judiciaries might consider alternative ways of assisting lawyers with
the problem identified here.
First, courts might develop processes to give authoritative guidance to lawyers
in specialized areas of practice about how to resolve hard ethics questions. For
example, courts might develop a judicial process for providing confidential
advisory opinions to lawyers on questions of legal ethics and for publishing the
opinions while preserving the anonymity of the inquiring lawyers. Many
judiciaries currently employ such processes to provide ethics advice to judges in
their jurisdiction regarding compliance with the applicable codes of judicial
conduct. 114 State judiciaries could offer similar advice to members of their state
bars, who, after all, are said to be "officers of the court."1 15 The judicial opinions
would have an advantage over opinions and guidelines issued by bar associations
in that they could be authoritative and, in any event, would receive more
deference.'1 16 Alternatively, other state judiciaries could adopt processes, such as
those currently employed in Kentucky and New Jersey, for selectively reviewing
ethics opinions issued by their state bar associations. 117 Through the review
process, courts could issue a limited number of advisory judicial opinions on
questions of particular importance that have not previously been addressed in
judicial opinions, thereby reducing lawyers' uncertainty.
Courts might also look for ways to reduce the risks lawyers face when they act
in good faith in areas of professional uncertainty. For example, courts might
explicitly adopt the principle that professional sanctions will not be imposed
when lawyers resolve uncertain ethics questions in good faith. Presently,
subordinate lawyers avoid sanction if they act "in accordance with a supervisory
lawyer's reasonable resolution of an arguable question of professional duty." 
118
Given the number of judicially unresolved disagreements about the meaning and
scope of the professional conduct rules, and the vagueness of some of the rules,
perhaps all lawyers should be given similar latitude. Many courts and disciplin-
ary authorities exercise discretion not to impose or pursue sanctions against
lawyers who, in their view, transgressed uncertain boundaries in good faith. 119
But lawyers would be better protected if this were a matter of law, since courts
114. See, e.g., Ariz. Comm'n on Jud'i Conduct, Jud'i Ethics Advisory Op., http://www.azcourts.gov/azcjc/
Judicial-Ethics-Advisory-Opinions [https://perma.cc/3V23-DYUR] (last visited Mar. 14, 2016).
115. See generally James A. Cohen, Lawyer Role, Agency Law, and the Characterization "Officer of the
Court", 48 BUFF. L. REv. 349 (2000).
116. See United States v. Smallwood, 365 F Supp. 2d 689, 684 n.10 (E.D. Va. 2005) (noting that bar
association representatives' informal advice on ethics questions is not binding and, history suggests, "may miss
the mark") (citing In re Ryder, 263 E Supp. 360, 362 63 (E.D. Va. 1967)).
117. See Ky. Sup. Ct. R. 3.530(12); N.J. Court Rules, R. 1:19-8 (2015).
118. MODEL RULES R. 5.2(b).
119. See In re Discipline of Haley, 126 P.3d 1262, 1271 72 (Wash. 2006) (applying new interpretation of rule
prospectively); see generally Bruce A. Green, Lawyer Discipline: Conscientious Noncompliance, Conscious
Avoidance, and Prosecutorial Discretion, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 1307, 1310 11 (1998) (discussing whether
disciplinary authorities, like prosecutors, should sometimes exercise discretion not to pursue provable charges).
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currently consider themselves free to sanction lawyers, including criminal
defense lawyers, who transgress uncertain standards. 
120
Likewise, courts might exercise authority to limit lawyers' risk of civil liability
where they exercise good faith judgment on questions of professional conduct in
areas of uncertainty. At present, when lawyers are sued for breaching their
fiduciary duties based on violations of unclear professional norms, juries
typically determine not only the lawyers' relevant conduct but the applicable
standard, often based on the competing testimony of expert witnesses or on vague
jury instructions. 121 But common-law courts could make the standard of liability
more protective by instructing juries that lawyers are not liable unless they acted
on an unreasonable understanding of their professional duty.
At the end of the day, lawyers can never be given absolutely clear guidance nor
can they be protected from all professional risk when acting in areas of
uncertainty. Like clients, lawyers sometimes have to exercise their best judgment
and hope that others will later see it as they did. That is the hazard of living in a
regulated society, and lawyers, by virtue of their training and experience, should
be expected to navigate legal and ethical complexities as well as anyone. But that
said, a well-regulated profession should not needlessly leave too many questions
of professional ethics unresolved.
120. See, e.g., Tyler v. State, 47 P.3d 1095 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001).
121. See Pamela A. Bresnahan & Timothy H. Goodman, Breach of Fiduciary Duty and Expert Testimony
Regarding Attorney Ethics Rules, 2003 Prof. Law. 53 (2003); Note, Developments in the Law Lawyers'
Responsibilities and Lawyers'Responses, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1547, 1564465 (1994).
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